cursus bijbels Hebreeuws

Heb je altijd al Hebreeuws willen leren maar ben je nooit zover gekomen? Ben je nieuwsgierig naar de grondtaal van de bijbel? Wil je zelfstandig op zoek naar sleutelteksten, zodat je vertalingen kunt vergelijken? Dan is de inleidingscursus Bijbels Hebreeuws misschien iets voor je.

In een prettige atmosfeer en onder deskundige begeleiding maak je kennis met de beginselen van de Hebreeuwse taal en zinsbouw. Ook al vergt het in het begin enige discipline en doorzettingsvermogen, je zult merken dat je al spoedig interessante inzichten opdoet.

Als cursusboek gebruiken we J.P. Lettinga, Grammatica van het bijbels Hebreeuws + Hulpboek. Dit boek is gemakkelijk antiquarisch te verkrijgen. Eventueel kun je gebruik maken van een latere editie (bijv. van Muraoka of van Baasten/Van Peursen).

Plaats: Zoetermeer, locatie wordt nog bekend gemaakt.
Data: maandagmiddag, vanaf 13 januari t/m 15 juni 2020 m.u.v. de schoolvakanties.
Kosten: €300,-
Docent: Dr Rico Sneller
Opgave en informatie: h.w.sneller…

Suffering as resistance against subliminal enhancement

‘Suffering’ designates an original, subliminal self-experience of the soul which may surface in limit experiences of conscious awareness. Consciously suffering pain, loss or loneliness actualises primordial suffering which confronts the soul with an original void ‘with which’ it as it were skirmishes (as though this void were an object – which it is not). This primordial suffering aggravates ‘superficial’ sorrow (sit venia verbo) by doubling it with radical despair.
Clearly, this insight is not new; it has been indirectly brought to light by psychoanalysis and existentialist philosophy. My claim, however, partly goes beyond psychoanalytical or existentialist concerns. 
Suffering, I argue, testifies to unconscious resistance against subliminal enhancement (which is my definition of 'death'). I agree with Freud, Sartre or Heidegger when they highlight the despair which exacerbates suffering. But at least Freud and Heidegger cannot do justice to suffering as inverted ecstasy. This …

Death as compression and decompression. James Joyce and Molly Bloom

A quick glance on James Joyce’s Ulysses, in particular its notorious last chapter which consists of Molly Bloom’s endless, unpunctuated soliloquy, shows that uncontrolled self-reflection repeatedly reminisces death; remarkably often in connection with lovemaking[1]. Not only does Molly Bloom frequently refer to the death of others; for example her youngest son who died as a baby, a tragedy jointly remembered with a lovemaking scene – a scene which ‘embraces’ the burial mention:
we came together when I was watching the two dogs up in her behind in the middle of the naked street that disheartened me altogether I suppose I oughtnt to have buried him in that little woolly jacket I knitted crying as I was but give it to some poor child but I knew well Id never have another our 1st death too it was we were never the same since O Im not going to think myself into the glooms about that any more I wonder why he wouldnt stay the night”. (my italics, RS)
Molly also mentions her own prospective d…

Proust, memory, and death

In a famous passage, Proust not only comes back to the ground-breaking involuntary memories which paved the way for his entire narrative; remarkably, he connects them with death
“[M]y apprehensions on the subject of my death [mes inquiétudes au sujet de ma mort]”, the narrator says, “had ceased from the moment when I had unconsciously recognised [reconnu inconsciemment] the taste of the little madeleine because at that moment the being that I then had been was an extra-temporal being and in consequence indifferent to the vicissitudes of the future.” 
It seems as if what the narrator calls the ”unconscious recognition” of a past moment in the present for the first time in his life illumines death for the narrator. It does so by removing his worries or uncertainties (inquiétudes). Memory takes away uncertainty, both the uncertainty about “my death” and the “vicissitudes of the future”. My death will no longer belong to the vicissitudes of the future, because my death – one could say – d…

Death as Trauma Processing

Freud’s disciple Oskar Pfister attributes the condensed life impression which may occur due to the shock experience of imminent death to anti-cathexis; the psyche, Pfister claims, offers consolation by erroneously suggesting that the selection of contemplated experiences make up for a whole life.[1]
To Pfister’s deprecatory account of enhanced recollection at death, I prefer Bergson’s. Bergson

Dreaming, recollection and recognition

The recollection-provoking assets of dreaming are salient: will, and the concomitant control and filter function of the mind, become gradually extinguished. As a result, the recollective function is strengthened:“der Schlaf [macht] häufig den im Wachen vorangegangen Prozess des Vergessens rückgängig”. (Carl du Prel, Philosophie der Mystik, p. 289) As a rule, dream content is drawn from memory even though it can only be recognised as such, if at all, upon awakening. As a matter of fact, dreaming can activate recollection without corresponding recognition: “es findet Reproduktion ohne Erinnerung statt”. (ib., p. 290)
If we take as an example Freud’s famous dream about Irma’s injection (quoted in his Traumdeutung), Freud can only recognise (that is, consciously re-mind, re-member) the dream events after awakening and upon subsequently reflecting on his dream (even more so upon a deliberate analysis of the dream). Awakening can make us ‘recollective’, that is, it may addrecognition (if at …

Presence, Face and Nature: Max Picard and Ludwig Klages

The presence of the face has a stabilising virtue as regards time and space. Compare the following passage in Max Picard, in which presence and eternity are succeeded by ‘temporarily’ expectant time and space.

“So warten Zeit und Raum still vor der Gegenwärtigkeit des Menschengesichtes, sie warten, dass die Ewigkeit hier zu ihnen trete. “Das Menschengesicht aber steht da wie ein Platzhalter der Ewigkeit, ruhig und strahlend. “Dann auf einmal haben Zeit und Raum lange genug gewartet, sie hören auf, stille zu stehen und brechen wieder auf. Aber die Zeit bewegt sich rhythmischer nun, wenn sie hier gewartet hat, und der Raum dehnt sich jetzt geordneter als vorher in seine Weite.
“Das ist das Geschenk der Gegenwärtigkeit an den Menschen: er ist durch sie aus Zeit und Raum herausgehoben”.[1]
As appears from this passage, presence is a qualitative category, both affecting time and space with relativity (‘surrounding’ them with presence), and inculcating them with content. The encounter with prese…